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CamuNAL LAw AND PROCEDURE
the Ohio Supreme Court held that despite the new statutes,23 the author-
ity to admit to the practice of law is exercised only by the court itself.
Since the Supreme Court Rules governing the practice of law provide that
only natural persons may be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio,24
attorneys will still be prohibited from incorporating. The court said
further that to the present members of the Ohio Bar, judging from the
briefs submitted, the issue was an emotional thing, much like "cats, olives
and Roosevelt" - either enthusiastically embraced or resolutely rejected.
GEORGE N. GAFFORD
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
Search and Seizure
The most important case affecting Ohio criminal law in 1961 was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio.' As a
result of this decision, evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement
officers is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court if timely ob-
jection is made. The federal exclusionary rule2 is now held to be a sub-
stantive part of the fourth amendment as applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. The state courts must now determine to
what extent they will be bound by the many decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in the field of search
and seizure.' Are these varied and sometimes irreconcilable precedents
to be regarded as substantive constitutional interpretations applicable to
both state and federal courts, or, will the Supreme Court allow state
courts to hold state law enforcement officers to less rigid standards than
do the federal courts? It is important to effective, intelligent law en-
forcement that the state courts establish judicial guideposts with dispatch.4
Withdrawal of Plea
In State v. Matthes' the defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded
guilty to several counts of violating the Ohio Securities Act. After sen-
tence to the Ohio Penitentiary was imposed, the defendant moved to
withdraw his plea of guilty because he had not realized the effect of such
a plea on his future ability to engage in the insurance business. The trial
tion and corporation statutes, see Vesely, The Ohio Professio-nal Associaion Law, 13 WnsT.
REs. L REv. 195 (1962).
23. Ohio Revised Code sections 1785.01-.08 inclusive became effective on October 17, 1961.
24. Rule XIV of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice.
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court denied the motion. The court of appeals held that the trial court
abused its discretion in not allowing the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
The court of appeals held that a defendant should know the consequences
of pleading guilty to a felony charge, and if he does not, the trial court
should allow him some latitude for withdrawing a plea.6
Impeachment by Prior Misdemeanor Conviction
In State v. Murdock7 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant
in a criminal case may be impeached as a witness by showing a convic-
tion of a misdemeanor not involving crimen falsi. The defendant,
charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol, was asked
over objection whether he had previously been convicted of the same
crime. The defendant, on appeal, argued that his previous conviction
was for violating a municipal ordinance and not a state statute! The
court held that the bill of exceptions filed by the defendant failed to dis-
close that the offense to which the question related was not a violation of
a state statute. A witness may therefore be impeached by showing a con-
viction under a state statute whether misdemeanor or felony. The Ohio
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether an impeachment may result
by showing a violation of a municipal ordinance which could also be a
violation of the state code.9 It is interesting to note that the question
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. A number of recent law review articles have surveyed the federal and state decisions in
this field in the light of the Mapp case. See, e.g., Day & Berkman, Search and Seizure and the
Exclusionary Rule, 13 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 57 (1961). This article takes the position that
the same rules governing admissibility of illegally seized evidence in federal courts should
be applied to state courts.
4. It is interesting to note that, until the United States Supreme Court hearing on Mapp,
the main question argued by both sides in the Ohio courts was the constitutionality of the
Ohio obscenity statute. Schroeder, Survey of Ohio Law - Constitutional Law, 12 WEsT.
RES. L. REv. 470 (1961).
5. 113 Ohio App. 326, 174 N.E.2d 264 (1961).
6. It would seem that a thorough examination of the defendant by the trial judge in open
court regarding the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea would avoid
any misunderstanding. It was not the intent of the court of appeals to allow a defendant
the opportunity to determine his sentence and, if he does not like it, withdraw his plea and
go to trial.
7. 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961). See also discussion in Evidence section, p.
483 infra.
8. The court is apparently placing the burden of showing that the offense was a violation
of a municipal ordinance on the defendant. In this case, however, if the defendant had been
convicted of an ordinance violation, was it the same crime?
9. In State v. Hamim, 104 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), the court of appeals held
that a conviction under an ordinance which could also have been a conviction under a statute
could be used for impeachment purposes. A conviction for a city ordinance violation not also
a statutory violation has been held not admissible to impeach a witness. Harper v. State,
106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922).
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propounded in the present case was for impeachment purposes and was
not asked as a back-door method of proving a like and similar act.
Like and Similar Acts
In a prosecution for sodomy the trial court instructed the jury that
the state was allowed to introduce testimony as to certain acts of the de-
fendant for the limited purpose of showing his moral disposition and
perversity, since a person with such a disposition would be more inclined
toward the crime charged.1" The defendant contended that the testimony
admitted was not within the purview of section 2945.59 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code. 1
A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court stated that although the word-
ing of the trial court's instruction was unfortunate, it was not prejudicial.
A strongly-worded dissent pointed out that admission of hearsay, tele-
phone calls, and the like, even for such a limited purpose, was so er-
roneous that it would probably be prejudicial."2
It appears to the author that the dissenters have taken a more practi-
cal view of the effect of this testimony. Although a trial court instructs
a jury as to the limited purpose of testimony, its admission has a great im-
pact upon a jury. Great care should be taken in allowing testimony as
to "like and similar acts" or the prosecution will place the defendant's
character and criminal record in evidence indiscriminately, thereby cloud-
ing the factual issue of the case at trial.
In State v. Chapman3 the defendant was convicted of incest. At the
trial the sister of the prosecutrix testified as to sexual relations with the
defendant eight years earlier. The court of appeals reversed the convic-
tion, because the so-called like and similar act was too remote in time to
show a course of conduct.
Remoteness in time is certainly a factor in determining a course of
conduct. However, it seems that high speed transportation has removed
the remoteness of locale as a factor in determining admissibility of "simi-
lar acts."
Former Jeopardy
In State v. Downey 4 the defendant, claiming former jeopardy, ob-
jected to a declaration of mistrial by the trial court. The appellate court
10. State v. Shively, 172 Ohio St. 128, 174 N.E.2d 104 (1961).
11. This section allows the state to introduce acts of the defendant which are like and
similar to the offense charged for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's motive,
intent, lack of mistake, identity, or modus operandi.
12. State v. Shively, 172 Ohio St. 128, 132, 174 N.E.2d 104, 107 (1961) (dissenting opin.
ion by Judges Herbert and Taft).
13. 111 Ohio App. 441, 168 N.E.2d 14 (1959).
14. 113 Ohio App. 250, 170 N.E.2d 75 (1960).
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held that the declaration of mistrial was not a final order and the claim
of former jeopardy could be made only as a plea at the subsequent trial
as provided by statute.'5
The statutory procedure was followed in State v. McGraw.' A jury
trial had been in progress for several days when the prosecuting attorney
realized that the indictment did not allege "purpose to kill," a requisite
for murder in the first degree. The state moved for a discontinuance of
the case based on section 2945.14 of the Ohio Revised Code.17 The mo-
tion was granted over objection by the defendant. A new indictment
properly charging first degree murder was returned and the defendant
was arraigned. The defendant entered a written plea of former jeopardy,
to which the state demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and dis-
charged the defendant. The court held that the statute relied upon by
the state for the discontinuance could only apply when there was a vari-
ance between the evidence and the offense charged. The court said that
jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn so long as the defendant could
have been convicted on a valid indictment by the evidence presented. In
the present case, although first degree murder was not properly charged,
the defendant, on the first indictment could have been convicted of first
degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder. The improper
discontinuance operated as an acquittal of manslaughter and was there-
fore a bar to a murder prosecution.
Lesser Included Offenses - Automobile Murder
In State v. Patterson' the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder after he voluntarily participated in a drag race which resulted in
three deaths. The "intent to kill," a necessary element to a successful
murder prosecution, was inferred by the defendant's awareness of the
probability of the final result. The defendant requested the court to
charge first and second degree manslaughter as lesser included offenses.
The trial court held that second degree manslaughter was not an included
offense and refused to charge on first degree manslaughter. The court
instructed the jury that the defendant could have been charged with sec-
ond degree manslaughter which did not require "intent to kill," but was
not so charged at the prosecutor's choice, and also instructed the jury that
it must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to infer "intent
15. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2943.03-.04.
16. 177 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
17. Section 2945.14 states: "If it appears during the trial and before submission to the
jury or court, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense in the indictment
or information, the court may order a discontinuance of trial without prejudice to the
prosecution."
18. 172 Ohio St. 319, 175 N.E.2d 741 (1961).
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-to kill." The court of appeals reversed the conviction of murder in the
second degree, holding that the jury should have been instructed on first
,degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of
-Ohio affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant could not have
been prejudiced since the refusal to charge first degree manslaughter, in
,effect, was a directed verdict of the lesser offense.
A court need not in every case instruct the jury on lesser included
'offenses unless necessitated by the facts. The court's opinion in this case
decries the tendency on the part of many trial courts to instruct juries on
-every possible included offense whether warranted by the facts or not.
In the opinion of this author juries should not be allowed the determina-
tion of punishment which in effect the multiplicity of choice allows.
Circumstantial Evidence
In a burglary prosecution ' the state established that: (1) the store
burglarized had been closed from noon one day until eight o'clock a. m.
the following day; (2) no authorized person was there during those
hours; (3) upon reopening, it was noticed that the skylight was broken;
(4) goods were missing; (5) the skylight was visible from neighboring
buildings; (6) the defendant performed his regular cruiser duty between
eight o'clock a. m. and four o'clock p. m. on the day in question; and
(7) the defendant's fingerprints were discovered near the skylight to
the store.
On these facts the defendant was convicted of burglary in the night
season. The court of appeals held that the state had failed to prove
"night season," and, there being no daytime included offenses, ordered the
defendant discharged. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The court held that the jury, applying the "common experience of man-
kind" to the determination of the time a person bent on burglary would
choose, was justified in convicting on this circumstantial evidence alone.
CRIMINAL LAw
Embezzlement
The defendant was tried and convicted as an aider and abettor to the
crime of embezzlement in State v. Glaros.2 ° The principal had already
pleaded guilty to embezzlement. The principal, an insurance adjustor, had
presented false and fraudulent claims to his company causing the insurer
to issue improper drafts. The appellate court reversed the conviction of
the accessary on several grounds. One interesting ground for this re-
19. State v. Stuttler, 172 Ohio St., 311, 175 N.E.2d 728 (1961).
20. 173 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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versal was that the state had not proven that the principal had embezzled.
The court held that the acts of the principal did not amount to obtaining
funds from an employer by virtue of employment, which is an element
required for embezzlement. The court stated that the acts of the prin-
cipal probably amounted to larceny by trick or false pretenses.2
Obscenity
In State v. Jacobellis22 the defendant was convicted of knowingly pos-
sessing and knowingly exhibiting a movie entitled "The Lovers," or "Les
Amants." The three-judge trial court, after viewing the movie, applied
the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United
States."3 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that ob-
scenity is not within the area of the constitutionally protected freedoms
of the first amendment. The reviewing court also saw the movie and
incorporated much of the written opinion of the trial court in its decision.
Both the trial and appellate court in describing the movie stated: "In a
tantalizing and increasing tempo the sexual appetite is whetted and lasciv-
ious thoughts and lustful desires are intensely stimulated."2 4
Bigamy - A New Statute
In 1960 a defendant was discharged at a preliminary hearing on a
bigamy charge since the evidence disclosed that the second marriage was
consummated in Indiana. 5 The Ohio statute at that time required venue
21. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal in 173 Ohio St. 63, 180 N.E.2d 134
(1962), stating in syllabus 1: "An employee who comes into possession of money or prop-
erty of his employer by the commission of a trespass or obtained such money or property
by larceny, larceny by trick, or false pretenses cannot convert or reconvert such money or
property thus unlawfully obtained to his own use so as to become guilty of the crime of
embezzlement."
22. 175 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), aff'd, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 450 supra.
23. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The trial court in the Jacobellis case cited syllabus 4(c) of the
Roth case as the test to be applied: "The standard for judging obscenity, adequate to with-
stand the charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether, to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole,
appeals to prurient interest."
24. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals in State v. Jacobellis, 173
Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962). The court after viewing the film held that the film
was "filth for money's sake." Counsel for the defendant have indicated that a petition for
certiorari will be filed in the United States Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court has
held obscenity to be a mixed question of law and fact, if admitted, "The Lovers" may receive
the equivalent of a trial de novo in that Court.
It is interesting to note that in State v. Warth, 173 Ohio St. 15, 179 N.E.2d 772 (1962),
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a misdemeanor conviction of a defendant for possessing
and exhibiting "The Lovers." The court held that section 2905.342 of the Ohio Revised
Code was unconstitutional in that there was no reference to knowledge or scienter on the
part of the accused. See also State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
25. State v. Schreckengost, 170 N.E.2d 307 (Akron Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
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